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Plaintiff/Appellant William V, Penney ("Penney") hereby 
submits the following REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT• All 
references "R." are to the district court record. 
DISPUTED FACTS 
1. Penney disagrees with defendants' repeated assertion1 that 
it is undisputed that Penney voluntarily resigned. However, a 
prima facie case has been made by sworn affidavits of Penney and of 
the defendants and by the defendants' express written admissions 
that a) Penney never resigned but only threatened to, which threat 
was NEVER accompanied by any specific date on which any such 
termination would be effective; b) defendant Williams considered 
and discussed with defendant E-Systems' management firing Penney 
before the issue of resignation was ever raised; c) defendant 
Williams had already decided to fire Penney before the issue of 
resignation was ever raised; d) that defendants Williams and 
Buchanan, together with Penney's immediate supervisor Mr. Cocke, 
determined the firing date of Penney and Penney's immediate 
supervisor Mr. Cocke "filled in '18 June 1986' as the effective 
date of ..." Penney's termination.2 
1
 See BRIEF OF APPELLEES, p. 27, f 2. 
2
 Penney testified under oath that, after he had firmly pled 
his position in the June 18, 1986 meeting (before the issue of 
resignation ever came up) , defendant Williams immediately fired 
Penney, saying, "It's all over. You're out of here." See Verified 
Complaint, R.2-20, f 33. Penney further testified that "[he] 
NEVER indicated to any of Defendants any DATE on which [Penney] 
would resign nor did [Penney] ever have any intention to resign. 
The 'effective date of ... resignation' listed on the Letter of 
Resignation was NOT filled in by nor at the request of [Penney] BUT 
rather was filled in by [Penney]'s supervisor Mr. J. G. Cocke, 
contrary to the desire of [Penney]. ... Defendant Williams [had] 
-1-
2. Penney disagrees with defendants' assertion3 that Penney 
had no written employment contract with defendant E-Systems. 
However, Penney testified and defendants have admitted that there 
was an employment contract between Penney and defendant E-Systems 
with specific express written terms and conditions by which 
defendants considered Penney legally bound.4 
... 'frequently threaten[ed] to fire [Penney] if every goal was not 
met and schedules not met." First Affidavit of William V. Penney, 
R.576 II 13-15. 
Defendants admit: "... the termination of [Penney]'s 
employment was discussed by management prior to his resignation. 
Shortly after the meeting on June 18, 1986, ... Mr. Williams and 
Mr. Cocke had discussions about what disciplinary action to take as 
a result of [Penney]'s unacceptable and insubordinate conduct. 
After deliberation, Mr. Cocke recommended to Mr. Williams that 
[Penney] be terminated. Mr. Williams concurred ... Mr. Cocke also 
consulted with Mr. Buchanan, who likewise thought that termination 
would be the appropriate disciplinary action." See Addendum to 
Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant, Exhibit "A", pp. 38-39, Response No. 
54. 
Defendant Williams testified: "After the meeting was 
terminated (before the issue of resignation was raised), Jim Cocke 
and I had a separate meeting to consider alternatives and 
appropriate action in response to the actions of Mr. Penney in the 
meeting. During that (second) meeting, we discussed possible 
alternatives including termination of Mr. Penney for rules 
violations (refusing to follow instructions and insubordination) 
..." Affidavit of David A. Williams, R.481, I 7. 
Defendants further admit: "Also in anticipation of the June 
18 meeting, [Penney] drafted a letter of resignation, and left the 
date of resignation space blank. ... Cocke, [Penney's] boss, filled 
in '18 June 1986' as the effective date of [Penney's]" termination. 
Defendants' Memorandum In Support Of Their Motion For Summary 
Judgment, R.437-471, II 9 & 11; Brief of Appellees, p. 29, 1 2 . 
3
 See BRIEF OF APPELLEES, p. 8, I 1, line 4. 
4
 Penney gave uncontroverted testimony that defendant E-
Systems had a specific policy on exempt overtime and "was not 
complying with its own policy on exempt overtime" with respect to 
Penney. Verified Complaint, R.2-20, I 19. Penney testified 
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3. Penney disagrees with defendants' assertion that 
"plaintiff, while represented by counsel, conducted extensive 
discovery."5 Penney's former attorney L. Zane Gill commenced 
discovery with Plaintiff's 1st Set of Interrogatories & Request for 
Production of Documents on July 11, 1990 (R.21-23) and also served 
on 10/2/1990 a Notice of Taking of Deposition of defendants 
Williams and Buchanan (R.70-71). When defendants finally responded 
to Penney's Interrogatories on 9/26/1990, the responses were 
riddled with objections, incomplete responses, and filled with 
promises to produce documents which Penney has never received6. 
(Verified Complaint R.2-20, f 17) and defendants admitted (Answer 
R. 33-45, f 17) that "As a director, [Penney] received annual 
physicals." 
Defendants admit (Brief of Appellees, p. 19 n 12, 14) that 
defendant E-Systems had a specific and express "procedure for 
converting [E-Systems' insurance] to an individual life insurance 
policy upon termination [which was] set forth in E-Systems7 PRU-OPT 
Plan ..." Defendants admitted (Addendum to Brief of 
Plaintiff/Appellant, Exhibit "A", Responses No. 31, 32, 44, 46, 47, 
49 & 52) that E-Systems had written corporate directives for 
"terminations" (Directive No. 200.4), for "performance appraisals" 
and "merit increases" (Directive No. 200.6), for "severance pay" 
(Directive No. 200.3), for "treatment of disabled" (Directive No. 
200.42), for "business conduct and ethics" (Directive No. 200.46). 
Indeed, defendants admitted that E-Systems has a "Corporate Policy 
Manual" which they promised "to produce ... at a time and place 
mutually convenient to counsel." Id., Response No. 23. 
It is NOTEWORTHY that there does NOT exist and that defendants 
have not produced any statement by Penney or other evidence that 
demonstrates that Penney was an "at-will" employee of defendant E-
Systems or that there was no written employment contract. 
5
 Brief of Appellees, p. 13, n 4. 
6
 Defendants promised: "Defendants will produce a copy of the 
E-Systems Corporate Policy Manual at a time and place mutually 
convenient to counsel." Addendum to Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Exhibit "A", Response No. 23. Penney has not received said manual 
from Defendants. 
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Shortly after serving the Notice of Taking of Deposition of 
defendants Williams and Buchanan, said depositions were continued 
to accommodate the schedules of defendants and/or their counsel and 
defendants have utterly failed to make defendants Williams or 
Buchanan available for deposition• Shortly thereafter, Mr. L. Zane 
Gill, Esq. withdrew as counsel for Penney (R.156-157), leaving him 
to represent himself Pro Se (R.158-163).7 
4. Penney disagrees with defendants' assertion8 that Penney 
has failed to point to any admissible evidence which would allow a 
reasonable fact finder to conclude that defendants engaged in 
outrageous conduct, and, thus, Penney has failed to raise any 
genuine issue of fact re Penney's claim for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress. However, Penney made a prima facie case9 as 
7
 Defendants's saying "while represented by counsel" is 
misleading. While Penney was living in Texas, was not represented 
by counsel and was recovering from major surgery, defendants, over 
the objections of Penney, scheduled a hearing of Defendants' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment of which defendants state: "The trial 
court went ahead with the hearing on June 19, 1992 ... at which it 
granted defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
dismissed plaintiff's first, third, fourth, and fifth causes of 
action with prejudice. R.416, 420-22. Plaintiff did not 
participate in the hearing in person or via telephone. R.416. 
(See Brief of Appellees, p. 13, n 4.) 
8
 See Brief of Appellees, p. 22 J[ 2, p. 23 f 3. 
9
 Penney testified that "on May 9, 1986 [he] was run off the 
road in a hit and run accident", Verified Complaint, R.2-20, that 
"As a result of the accident, [Penney] was in extreme pain." Id., 
R.2-20, ffl 27 & 28; First Affidavit of William V. Penney, R.573-
585, 5 11. 
Penney further testified that "Williams had never shown any 
toleration for health problems. Williams would make fun of those 
with health problems including [Penney]. On one occasion Williams 
had commented regarding an employee down with back trouble, "Well 
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follows: 
a. Defendant Williams, acting individually and on behalf of 
defendant E-Systems as the general manager of its Montek 
Division, intentionally, wilfully, and maliciously acted 
repeatedly and over a prolonged period of time toward 
Penney so as to cause him the maximum emotional stress 
possible. 
b. The intentional, wilful, and malicious conduct of 
defendant Williams was outrageous in the extreme. 
c. Penney suffered severe emotional distress and substantial 
physical suffering as a direct and proximate result of 
the intentional, wilful, and malicious conduct of 
hell, there's nothing wrong with his hands. Send the work over 
there and make him do it in bed." Verified Complaint, R.2-20, fl 
16; First Affidavit of William V. Penney, R.573-585, f 11. 
Penney testified that in response to his request for sick 
leave or vacation time off to have medical treatment for injuries 
sustained in a June 18, 1986 automobile accident, defendant 
"Williams enumerated the projects upon [Penney] was working at that 
time and informed [Penney] that he had the option of completing the 
projects or losing his jobs." Verified Complaint, R.2-20, f 30. 
"[Penney] (was forced to) continue to work for the next five 
or six weeks in extreme pain." Id., f 31. 
Penney testified that "The [defendant E-Systems] was not 
complying with its own policy on exempt overtime." Id., f 19. 
Penney further testified that he was forced by Williams to "work 
extremely long hours" (Id., f 14), "to work ... tremendous number 
of hours" (Id., f 17), that Penney told defendant Williams that 
Penney7s health "was deteriorating due to the vast number of 
overtime hours Williams was forcing [Penney] to work." id., fl 21. 
Penney testified that "In 1986 [Penney's physical showed 
skipped heartbeats and other signs of stress induced by the 
tremendous number of hours he had be [forced to work]" and that 
Penney's health "was deteriorating due to the vast number of 
overtime hours Williams was forcing [Penney] to work." Jd., ff 17 
& 21. 
Defendants admitted that "[Penney] may have sometimes worked 
long hours". Answer, R.33-45, f 14. Defendants also admitted 
that, when they fired Penney, he had "accrued approximately 40.04 
hours of vacation leave and approximately 240 hours of sick leave." 
Addendum to Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant, Exhibit "A", f 63. 
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defendant Williams. 
Defendants intentional, wilful, and malicious acts in denying an 
injured and suffering employee (Penney) any opportunity to seek 
medical treatment upon penalty of losing his job, and in attempting 
to coerce and intimidate Penney into resigning by forcing him in 
his injured and painful state work tremendous numbers of hours of 
overtime to the point of deteriorating his health, all the while 
mocking and making fun of him for his disability, injury and pain, 
certainly is outrageous conduct sufficient to make out a prima 
facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
5. Penney disagrees with defendants' assertion10 that Penney 
does not even claim he was asked to do or participate in anything 
fraudulent in connection with the General Electric contract and 
that the events leading up to Penney's resignation had nothing to 
do with the General Electric Contract. Penney testified and 
defendants admit11 that "GE agreed to [and did] pay for" certain 
nuclear certified material. Penney testified that these nuclear 
certified materials, which were then "owned by General Electric",12 
were being illegally sold by defendant E-Systems to third parties. 
Penney was terminated by defendants, at least in part, because 
defendant E-Systems' management, including defendant David A. 
Williams, became aware that Penney knew of these illegal 
See Brief of Appellees, p. 31, n. 22; p. 35 \ 1. 
See BRIEF OF APPELLANTS, p. 34 J 3. 
See Verified Complaint, R. 2-20, \ 59.a. 
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activities, was likely to expose defendants' illegal activities, 
AND WOULD REFUSE TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY CONCEALMENT OR COVERUP OF 
THESE ILLEGAL ACTS, 
6. Penney disagrees with defendants' assertion13 that 
Northrup was fully aware of all sourcing changes made under the 
Northrup contract and, implicitly, agreed with and was not deceived 
by defendant E-Systems deceptive and illegal acts in charging 
Northrup for tools which defendant E-Systems was supposed to make 
but never did. Penney was fired, in part, because he protested to 
defendants' management that defendants were improperly and 
illegally billing for and receiving payments for tooling and 
because Penney refused David A. Williams' demand to doctor vendor 
purchase orders to allow [defendant E-Systems] to receive payment 
for nonexistent work.14 
7. Penney disagrees with defendants' assertion15 that no 
triable issue of fact existed in connection with the Hazletine 
Contract. Defendants are attempting to perpetrate a fraud on this 
Court of Appeals and on the district court by asserting that "There 
was no change in the scope of the work to be performed under the 
13
 See Brief of Appellee, p. 38, f 1. 
14
 See Verified Complaint, R. 2-20, f 59.6. NOTE: 
Defendants' assertions at Brief of Appellees p. 38 that Northrup 
"in approx March 1987" audited costs, "in July 1988, E-Systems 
properly invoiced Northrup . ..", and "Northrups' Property 
Administrator have audited and signed off on E-Systems' tooling 
list every year since 1986" is TOTALLY MEANINGLESS AND IRRELEVANT 
because if it happened at all (it is not verified by any Northrup 
employee), it happened after Penney was fired. 
15
 See Brief of Appellees, p. 39, Caption #3. 
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[Hazeltine] contract. There was no changes in the scope of the 
work to be performed under the contract" and that ,f [Penney]'s 
allegations also do not make sense in the light of the fact that 
the Hazeltine contract was a firm fixed price contract."16 
Contrast these fraudulent assertions with defendant E-Systems' own 
allegations made in its own Complaint in E-SYSTEMS, INC./MONTEK 
DIVISION v. HAZELTINE CORPORATION. Civil No. C-89-0904469 CV, filed 
JULY 20, 1989, in the THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, (a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A" 
hereto) in which E-Systems sued Hazeltine over the VERY SAME 
contract about which Penney complained. E-Systems sued Hazeltine 
for "not less than $20,000,000", alleging that Hazeltine had 
"refused to reimburse E-Systems for the added costs and expenses 
reasonably incurred by it in order to perform these changes." See 
Exhibit "A", p. 18, f 46, and p. 8, f 17. 
8. Penney disagrees with defendants'' assertion17 they have a 
right to rely on the improperly taken and never-timely published 
Deposition of Penney for purposes of this appeal. See PLAINTIFF'S 
OBJECTION TO DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER AND STATEMENT ALLOWING FILING 
OR USE OF PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION BY DEFENDANTS, a copy of which is 
attached as Exhibit "B" hereto, which was served on the district 
court and this Court of Appeals on August L9, 1993, and which sets 
forth the improper circumstances evidencing that Penney's 
deposition was improperly taken in breach of an express written 
16
 See Brief of Appellees, p. 40 & 41. 
17
 See Brief of Appellees, p. 26, 43. 
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agreement by defendants' counsel and was never filed and published 
with the district court until after judgment was already entered in 
the above case, meaning that the district court judge NEVER had 
access to a copy of Penney7s deposition until after judgment was 
entered. 
9. Penney disagrees with defendants' assertion18 that 
Penney's allegation that he had no had adequate opportunity to 
complete discovery is untrue. Defendants admit19 that Penney was 
without any representation from March 22, 1992 forward, when 
Penney's last attorney David K. Isom withdrew. The Affidavit of 
Allen J. Meril, M.D. (R.564-572), a copy of which is attached as 
Exhibit "C" hereto, incontrovertibly proves that Penney underwent 
major surgery on March 10, 1992, just before attorney Isom 
withdrew, and again on August 19, 1992. Hence, Penney was without 
counsel and recovering from the debilitating effects of two major 
surgeries when the district court held its June 19, 1992 hearing on 
defendants' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, when the district 
court held its August 3, 1992 Scheduling Conference, and when the 
defendants made and the district court ruled upon the MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
10. Penney disagrees with defendants' assertion20 that errors 
in the Court's August 3, 1992 scheduling order were harmless error. 
18
 See Brief of Appellees, p. 44, f 4. 
19
 See Brief of Appellees, p. 3 f 1) . 
20
 See Brief of Appellees, p. 6, n. 1. 
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11. Penney disagrees with defendants' assertion21 that Penney 
maintains a local address and spends "a significant amount of time 
in the Salt Lake City area." Defendants offer no evidence to 
support this assertion and there is none. Penney has a brother who 
lives in Sandy, Utah, who has previously received some mail for 
Penney. However, Penney resides in Texas and, since 1986, has only 
come to Utah when required to do so by the district court in the 
above case. 
12. Penney disagrees with defendants' assertion22 that Penney 
has never claimed to have been incapacitated "at all times since 
the date he commended this lawsuit or since the date of the 
scheduling conference." See Disputed Facts number 9. 
SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiff Penney rejects defendants7 assertion that there are 
no genuine issues of material fact disputed by the parties in this 
case. In reply to defendants' brief, Penney presents the following 
arguments: 
1. The material fact of whether or not Penny was terminated 
is not only in dispute, Penney has produced case law and other 
factual evidence necessary to proffer a prima facie case on this 
issue. Therefore, the trial court erred in deciding the issue of 
termination as a matter of law. 
2. Penney believes that contrary to public policy he was 
fired because: (a) he refused to commit or condone wrongful acts, 
21
 See Brief of Appellees, p. 45, \ 2. 
22
 See Brief of Appellees, p. 46, top. 
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(b) he attempted to exercise his legal right to take sick leave, 
and (c) defendants feared he might disclose certain of defendants' 
illegal activities. 
3. Plaintiff Penney asserts that defendants erroneously rely 
on three summary judgment cases that are factually distinguishable 
from the instant case. Penney cites case law and statute 
supporting his belief that defendants did not meet their initial 
burden of proving there are no issues of material fact to be 
determined in the instant case. 
4. Penney cites case law supporting his assertion that the 
instant case is not governed by the ERISA statute. Penney proffers 
legal argument demonstrating that the ERISA statute has no material 
bearing on the outcome or the damages in the instant case. 
Therefore, it would be inappropriate for the court to say that the 
case before it somehow relates to ERISA. 
5. Penney asserts that defendants intentionally engaged in 
an on-going, complex pattern of conduct that, considered all 
together, rises to the threshold level required to allege a prima 
facie showing of outrageous conduct. There is a genuine issue here 
for trial where reasonable people could find that plaintiff's 
allegations (if taken as true) support his claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. 
6. Penney provides factual evidence supporting his assertion 
that his case was unfairly damaged by: 
(a) defendants' lack of cooperation with his discovery efforts, (b) 
the district court's disregard of his severe medical problems, and 
-11-
(c) defendants obtaining unfair advantage through being the only 
party to complete discovery. Plaintiff further asserts that the 
district court's cutting off the discovery process in spite of 
Plaintiffs extenuating circumstances was premature and unfairly 
prejudiced his case. 
REPLY ARGUMENTS 
I. The district court erred when it resolved the factual 
dispute of whether or not plaintiff was constructively 
terminated in violation of public policy. 
Defendants continue to erroneously aver that it is undisputed 
fact that Penney resigned from his employment. From the outset of 
this litigation Penney has asserted that defendants either actively 
and constructively terminated his employment with them. In fact, 
there has never been agreement on this issue, nor has there been 
agreement on the facts and interpretation of the facts surrounding 
Penney's termination. 
Defendants recite their own version of the facts as support 
for their faulty contention that Penney indisputably resigned. 
However, by disputing Penney's version of the facts, defendants, 
themselves, have created a triable issue of fact23. 
In Jenks v. Mountain States T&T Co., 53 FEP Cases 1709, 1714 
n.5 (1989), the court addressed a similar dispute over whether the 
23
 Defendant Williams admits Penney did NOT resign but that 
Williams discussed firing Penney with his immediate supervisor Mr. 
Cocke before Penney ever raised the issue of resignation. 
Defendant Williams determined the date to fire Penney, instructed 
Mr. Cocke to specify the date in writing and inform Penney that he 
was terminated effective immediately. See Affidavit of Williams. 
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plaintiff had resigned or whether she had been fired. The Jenks 
court reached the following conclusion: 
Jenks has alleged and testified that she was terminated. 
Consequently, at this juncture the court does not need to 
determine whether plaintiff has made a showing of constructive 
discharge. Mountain Bell,s evidence that Jenks quit only 
creates a factual dispute. It does not increase plaintiff7s 
prima facie burden. 
Like the plaintiff in Jenks, Penney has presented evidence 
that his employment with defendants had been involuntarily 
terminated.24 And, similar to defendant Mountain Bell in Jenks, 
defendants in the instant case have insisted that Penney resigned. 
This disagreement creates a factual dispute. However, as the 
court found in Jenks, it neither increases plaintiff's prima facie 
burden nor demands the court's attention as to whether there has 
been a showing of constructive discharge. 
In reply to defendants' argument claiming that plaintiff did 
not identify the basis for any substantial and important public 
policy implicated by his alleged termination, please see 
plaintiff's arguments previously presented in Brief of Plaintiff 
pages 17-24. 
Penney believes that there are substantial and important 
public policy concerns that were violated when E-Systems fired him. 
In his brief, plaintiff argues that it is contrary to public policy 
24
 Penney has established a prima facie case by affidavit 
supporting his claim that he was fired or constructively 
terminated. For example, in Penney's First Affidavit par. 11, 
Penney testified that defendants had threatened to fire him on 
numerous occasions and that they had tried to coerce and intimidate 
him into resigning. However, Penney also testified that he would 
not resign because he could not afford to lose his insurance. 
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for E-Systems to fire Penney because: (1) he refused to commit or 
condone wrongful acts, (2) Penney attempted to exercise his legal 
right to take sick leave, and (3) Penney might disclose certain of 
defendants' illegal activities.25 
II. The district court erred when it (1) ruled that 
defendants had proven the absence of a genuine issue 
concerning any material fact, and (2) failed to construe 
that complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff 
or indulge all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's 
favor. 
In defendants' brief, (p. 6, N. 1) defendants admit that in 
its scheduling order the district court erroneously entered the 
cut-off date for dispositive motions as January 4, 1992. However, 
plaintiff - as a PRO SE litigant - relied to his detriment, on the 
court's written scheduling order. 
Consequently, Penney was completely surprised and unprepared 
for defendants' summary judgment motion, relying on the court's 
erroneous document stating that the time for all such motions had 
long passed. 
The court, therefore, unfairly accepted defendants' motion 
after causing Penney to rely on an erroneous scheduling order. 
Defendants erroneously argue that the appellate court cannot 
consider Penney's case because the issues were not clearly defined 
prior to summary judgment. 
25
 See Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment for specific, factual details regarding some of 
defendants' illegal and wrongful acts and their material bearing on 
Penney's termination.(R. 655-680, Also included in Addendum to 
Brief of Plaintiff Exhibit "C") 
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Defendants rely on three cases in support of their argument: 
(1) Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management. 645 P.2d 667, 671 
(Utah 1982); (2) State v. Castner.825 P.2d 699, 705 n.4 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992); and (3) Lebaron & Assoc, v. Rebel Enterprises. 823 P.2d 
479, 482-84 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In order to bolster their 
argument, defendants have purposely misquoted the courts in both 
Turtle and Castner, substituting the words "District Court" for the 
courts' words "trial court" in both instances. 
Perhaps defendants intend to draw the court's attention away 
from the fact that all three cases mentioned above were very 
different from the instant case of Mr. Penney. The plaintiffs in 
all three of the above cases were allowed complete trials with 
their appeals being raised only after the verdict had been 
rendered. 
Unlike the appellants in Turtle. Castner. and Lebaron. Penney 
has never had the opportunity to raise any issues at trial. 
Indeed, this entire appeal is to determine whether Penney, who has 
recovered from his injury and regained sufficient physical and 
emotional strength effectively to participate fully in this 
litigation, will be given his day in court. Turtle. Castner. and 
Lebaron stand only for the proposition that an issue must be raised 
at trial in order to preserve its claim on appeal. Therefore, 
these cases do not apply to Penney's situation in the instant case. 
A more appropriate standard in the instant case would be that 
set forth in Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co. . 823 P. 2d 1055, 
1058 (Utah 1991) where the court recognized the necessity to 
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construe the complaint in "the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor." In 
doing so, the court inferred from the pleadings an issue of 
defamation that had not been specifically defined in the complaint 
itself. 
In the federal system, the standard for summary judgement is 
set by Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 which stands for 
the principle that summary judgement is only applicable where the 
moving party can fully "meet its initial burden of establishing the 
absence" of a genuine issue. Even if the motion for summary 
judgment goes unopposed, Adickes further states that the inferences 
to be drawn from all the underlying facts contained in the moving 
party's materials must be viewed in a light most favorable to the 
party opposing the motion. 
The materials to be considered in a summary judgment motion 
are outlined in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
which reads in pertinent part: 
[A summary judgment] shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. 
Defendants have failed to meet their initial burden of proving 
that there are no genuine issues of fact in the instant case. 
III. The district court erred in ruling that the ERISA 
statute bars the instant case from its 
jurisdiction. 
Defendants rely on the following three cases in support of 
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their contention that Penney's claim is barred by ERISA: (1) Shaw 
v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983); (2) Pilot Life Ins, Co. 
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987); and (3)Inqersoll-Rand Co. v. 
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990). 
However, all three cases are easily distinguishable from the 
instant case. In the above-mentioned ERISA cases, the plaintiffs7 
causes of action were integrally based on whether or not an ERISA 
claim existed, and they required the courts' analyses of the ERISA 
claim. The Ingersoll-Rand court held: "Because the existence of a 
plan is a critical factor in establishing liability, and the trial 
court7s inquiry must be directed to the plan, this judicially 
created cause of action 'relate[s] to' an ERISA plan." Inqersoll-
Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133,133 (1990). 
Unlike the Inqersoll-Rand and Shaw plaintiffs, Penney does not 
claim that defendants7 motive for dismissing him was to deprive 
them of ERISA benefits. The court in the instant case is not 
required to determine any legal issues relating to ERISA. 
In the instant case, Penney is only claiming that loss of 
insurance due to defendants7 negligent or willful departure from 
company policy26 resulted in damages easily calculated by the 
existence of Penney7s medical bills which he had to pay without 
26
 In Appellees7 Brief, defendants admit that they had a duty 
to provide plaintiff with the insurance conversion form. They 
further admit that the procedure was one expressly provided by E-
Systems7 own Health Care and Weekly Income Disability Plan. 
(Defendants7 Brief, page 19 paragraph 9 and footnote 12.) 
By violating their own express policy, defendants have 
severely injured plaintiff. They should not now be allowed to hide 
behind an ERISA statute to shield them from the rightful 
consequences of their wrongful actions. 
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benefit of insurance. 
Whether or not the plaintiff was covered by the ERISA statute 
has no material bearing on the outcome or the damages in the 
instant case. Therefore, it would be inappropriate for the court 
to say that the case before it somehow relates to ERISA. 
IV. The district court should have found that defendants' 
pattern of conduct rises to a level which reasonable 
minds could conclude was sufficiently outrageous to 
support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. 
In order for plaintiff to defeat a summary judgment motion on 
this issue, he need only allege conduct sufficient to support a 
claim for emotional distress. The court in Jenks v. Mountain 
States T & T Co., 53 FEP Cases 1709, 1713 referred to the decision 
rendered in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249 
(1986) when it stated, " At the summary judgment stage, the court's 
function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth, but 
to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." 
Defendants seem to think that plaintiff has no right to a jury 
trial on the issue unless he first "proves" his case to the trial 
judge. (See Brief of Defendants p. 21.) Defendants have 
apparently forgotten that the purpose of a trial is to "prove" to 
the trier of fact the merits of the claims asserted. 
Certainly, Plaintiff Penney has alleged conduct that 
reasonable people could determine is outrageous.27 
Defendants cite a case where a supervisor's racial slurs, 
27
 See Plaintiff's Brief pages 24-31 for arguments describing 
defendants' pattern of conduct designed to cause plaintiff severe 
emotional and physical distress. 
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jokes and other rude and non-sympathetic behavior toward the 
plaintiff were not found to be outrageous. In the instant case, 
however, Penney has alleged an on-going, complex pattern of conduct 
that, considered all together, rises to the threshold level 
required to allege a prima facie case of outrageous conduct. 
Defendants also cite Jenks (supra) as an example of a 
plaintiff who did not allege sufficient damage that might sustain 
a claim for emotional distress. Plaintiff Penney is very different 
from the plaintiff in Jenks. The plaintiff in Jenks stated that 
she felt turmoil and a "sort of depression" over losing her job. 
Penney, on the other hand, has alleged much more emotional 
distress than did the plaintiff in Jenks who claimed only a "sort 
of depression" over being fired. In the instant case, Penney has 
claimed that defendant Williams exercised his authority to carry 
out a campaign of intimidation and coercion against plaintiff with 
the intent to create an intolerable work place situation. 
Plaintiff alleges the following conduct that taken as a whole 
created an intolerable working environment:28 
(1) That because of his health problems, he was subjected to 
ridicule and ostracization by defendant Williams; 
(2) That he was denied access to projects, relieved of 
resources and authority, while given an increased work load; 
(3) That he was forced to work hundreds of hours of overtime, 
28
 The following claims are supported by facts alleged in 
Plaintiff's Complaint and in Plaintiff's First Affidavit. For a 
more complete statement of the facts surrounding Penney's claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, see also Brief of 
Plaintiff, pages 6-11. 
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even during illness; 
(4) That he was under constant threat of firing; and 
(5) That he was refused his lawfully accrued vacation time and 
sick leave, and even denied the right to use vacation time for 
doctor appointments after he was injured in an automobile accident. 
Reasonable people could find, under such circumstances, that 
Penney did indeed suffer severe emotional distress from his 
treatment by defendant E-Systems. The court is obligated to look 
at the allegations in a light most favorable to plaintiff before 
deciding whether plaintiff has pled a prima facie case on this 
issue. 
Defendants erroneously claim that Penney's emotional distress 
claim is barred by Utah Workers' Compensation Act. In Mounteer v. 
Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991) the court held 
that the Utah Workers' Compensation Act bars claims based on a co-
worker's injurious acts unless they were intended or directed by 
the employer. 
In the instant case, Penney makes no claim against a co-
worker . His claims are solely based on and confined to the actions 
of Defendant E-Systems and its agents, those in management 
positions with authority over Plaintiff Penney. 
Therefore, the Workers' Compensation argument presented by 
defendants is not applicable in this case. 
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V. The district court should have considered Penney's 
extraordinary circumstances, and the court erred when it 
prejudiced Penney's case by prematurely cutting off 
discovery. 
It is not unheard of for discovery in complicated civil cases 
to take several years to complete even where all litigants are in 
best of health and reside in close proximity to the trial court. 
In their motion for an extension of time to respond to 
plaintiff's appellate brief, defendants, themselves, noted the 
complex nature of the case and the arguments involved. Although 
the defendants are represented by a large legal firm that can draw 
on multiple staff and resources, they pled extenuating personal 
circumstances and case complexity as a reason for requiring the 
extension of time. 
Defendants apparently expect a double standard when it comes 
to the court's granting extensions of time. Although defendants 
have begged the court's indulgence due to their own circumstances, 
they have shown a total disregard for Penney's misfortunes, part of 
which are of defendants' making.29 
The following list of Penney's extenuating circumstances will 
demonstrate clearly why the district court should have granted 
Penney additional time for discovery: 
1. During the two years of discovery Penney underwent five 
major surgeries. (Dr. Meril Affidavit R. 603) 
2. Each surgery naturally required extensive recuperation. 
The court showed little or no consideration for Penney's 
surgery schedules or recuperation when it arranged its 
own docket. (Dr. Meril Affidavit R. 603) 
29
 See R. 70-71. 
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3. Because defendants7 actions rendered Penney uninsured and 
uninsurable, Penney was forced to spend all his personal 
assets on medical treatment. 
4. Penney was unable to continuously employ and effectively 
work with legal counsel during most of this discovery 
period because of his impecuniosity caused by his 
extensive medical treatment, and because of his resultant 
physical and mental incapacitation making it difficult to 
deal with the numerous complex facts and issues of 
discovery. 
5. Penney had the additional burden of trying to pursue this 
discovery, pro se, while living out of the State of Utah. 
6. Penney7s attempts to complete discovery were frustrated 
by: (1) defendants7 lack of cooperation in scheduling 
their depositions, and (2) their evasive or incomplete 
responses to plaintiff's interrogatories and request for 
production of documents. 
7. Defendants themselves admit (in their motion for 
enlargement of time in which to file their Brief of 
Appellees) to the complex nature of this case, and assert 
that the issues herein cannot be easily dealt with. 
Plaintiff Penney cooperated fully with defendants7 efforts to 
take his deposition and made himself fully available for discovery, 
even though he was required to travel back and forth between Utah 
and his home in Texas. However, once defendants had achieved their 
discovery objectives, they sought to avoid giving Penney any 
document or deposition necessary to the completion of his 
discovery. 
Instead, they succeeded in cutting off the date for discovery, 
fully aware of Penney7s impecuniosity, his inability to travel 
frequently to Utah, his physical and emotional break down, his pro 
se status, his inexperience with the legal system, and their own 
recalcitrance. 
Considering Penney7s entire list of extenuating 
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circumstances, reasonable minds could clearly conclude that the 
district court abused its discretion in prematurely cutting off 
discovery in the instant case. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is a fundamental principle of civil procedure that the 
moving party in a summary judgment motion must show "the absence of 
a genuine issue concerning any material fact." Adickes v. S. H. 
Kress & Co.. 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed. 2d 142. 
The general formula for the administration of a summary 
judgment motion has been long established and was reiterated in 
Corwin v. Los Angeles Newspaper Serv. Bur. Inc., 484 P.2d 953, 958 
(1971) (Emphasis added.): 
The matter to be determined by the trial court in considering 
such a motion is whether the defendant (or the plaintiff) has 
presented any facts which give rise to a triable issue. The 
court may not pass upon the issue itself. Summary judgment is 
proper only if the affidavits in support of the moving party 
would be sufficient to sustain a judgment in his favor and his 
opponent does not by affidavit show such facts as may be 
deemed . . . sufficient to present a triable issue. . . . 
[T]he affidavits of the moving party are strictly construed 
and those of his opponent liberally construed, and doubts as 
to the propriety of granting the motion should be resolved in 
favor of the party opposing the motion. Such summary procedure 
is drastic and should be used with caution so that it does not 
become a substitute for the open trial method of determining 
the facts. 
The nature of the evidence presented by defendants in support 
of their motion for summary judgment is in the form of affidavits 
which simply deny some of the allegations and facts introduced by 
plaintiff in the prosecution of his claim. These affidavits prove 
nothing more than the existence of a factual dispute between the 
parties. They carry no more weight than the affidavits of the 
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plaintiff; in fact, being strictly construed for the purposes of 
the motion, they carry very much less weight than the affidavits of 
the plaintiff. 
Although plaintiff also has submitted opposing affidavits and 
other evidence to support his claim,30 defendants wish the court to 
consider only their affidavits as evidence in the case. It appears 
that defendants are hoping to reverse the rules by expecting the 
court to strictly construe plaintiff's affidavits while giving them 
every liberal interpretation that might be given to documents 
accepted at face value. 
Apparently, defendants wish to try all issues of this case by 
affidavit as a substitute for the open trial method of determining 
the facts. They have thus far succeeded in denying plaintiff his 
full discovery and hope to succeed in altogether denying him his 
day in court. 
Plaintiff prays that this court will weigh the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits and other documents produced in discovery 
in the light most favorable to his case. Plaintiff prays that this 
court will re-open the discovery process so that he may take the 
deposition of defendants and witnesses essential to the proving of 
his claims. Plaintiff prays that this court will also consider the 
extraordinary extenuating circumstances caused by the combination 
of his severe health problems, his impecuniosity, his out-of-state 
30
 See Plaintiff's Response (with its accompanying exhibits) 
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff's Affidavits, 
and the Affidavit of Dr. Alan J. Meril, a Long with the Docketing 
Statement and other documents included in the record and the 
addenda. 
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residency, and his pro se status in deciding whether he has been 
given full access to, and benefit of, the consideration of the 
district court in the prosecution of his claims. 
And finally, Plaintiff prays that after due consideration this 
court will overturn the trial court's harsh summary judgment 
verdict, that has summarily disposed of his claims without the 
benefit of completing discovery or of presenting his issues of fact 
before a jury. 
// 
// 
" , * * 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /t) day of September, 1993 
n e y ^ f William V. Pen ey 
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Plaintiff E-Systems, Inc./Montek Division, by counsel, 
files this Complaint against defendant Hazeltine Corporation, and 
for its Complaint states and alleges as follows: 
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JURISDICTION 
1. Jurisdiction of this Court is based upon Utah Code 
Ann, § 78-3-4/ and upon the Utah long-arm statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-24. 
VENUE 
2. Venue in this Court is based upon Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-13-4/ in that the plaintiff is doing business in this 
judicial district and the events and actions giving rise to this 
cause of action occurred or were taken or the effects were felt in 
this judicial district. 
PARTIES 
3. Plaintiff E-Systems, Inc., Montek Division 
("E-Systems"), is a division of E-Systems, Inc., a Delaware 
corporation having its principal place of business in Dallas, 
Texas. The Montek Division, which designs, develops and 
manufactures advanced electronic navigational equipment and 
avionics, maintains its principal office at 2268 South 3270 West, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119. 
4. Upon information and belief, defendant Hazeltine 
Corporation ("Hazeltine") is a Delaware corporation having its 
principal place of business on Cuba Hill Road, Greenlawn, New York. 
FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS 
5. In early 1982, E-Systems began research and 
development work on a ground-based transponder system known as 
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"DME/P," an acronym standing for "Precision Distance Measuring 
Equipment." The DME/P is crucial to, and E-Systems* efforts were 
made in anticipation of, the Federal Aviation Administration's 
("FAA") Microwave Landing System program ("MLS"), a "next 
generation" navigation and guidance system designed to increase 
the number of instrument approaches and landings that could be 
made at various airports across the nation. The DME/P system, 
function of which the ground-based DME/P transponder is a crucial 
part, provides very precise, continuous information regarding 
distance (range) between the airport and an aircraft executing an 
MLS instrument approach, and displays that distance in the cockpit 
for use by the crew during the approach. 
6. On December 7, 1982, and in anticipation of the 
solicitation of bids for the MLS program, E-Systems and Hazeltine 
entered into a Teaming Agreement, one of the purposes of which was 
to facilitate an integrated approach by the parties to compete 
for, and meet the demands of, the anticipated FAA contract award 
for the MLS program. A copy of the December 1982 Teaming 
Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein 
by reference. 
7. Pursuant to the terms of the 1982 Teaming Agreement, 
Hazeltine was to serve as the prime contractor on any contract 
awarded by the FAA. E-Systems, in turn, was to act as the 
subcontractor for the design, testing and production of the 
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DME/P. The 1982 Teaming Agreement further imposed certain 
pre-award and post-award obligations on both parties, including 
significant obligations on E-Systems' part to provide technical 
expertise and assistance in the preparation of Hazeltine's 
proposal for the MLS contract. 
8. Based upon performance specifications released by the 
FAA in advance of its formal Request for Proposals and upon 
Hazeltine's instructions as to what would be necessary to meet the 
FAA specifications, E-Systems continued work at its own expense on 
the development and testing of the DME/P through the spring of 
1983. 
9. It was Hazeltine's and E-Systems* intent to develop a 
full system design prior to submission of a proposal to the FAA so 
that the Hazeltine proposal could include actual, measured data 
demonstrating that the E-Systems' design for the DME/P fully 
complied with the FAA specifications. The parties believed that 
this strategy would serve several objectives. First, it would 
provide a high degree of confidence that the specification 
requirements could be met by the proposed design. Also, it would 
both permit the submission of the offer to perform under a 
fixed-price contract requested by the FAA and demonstrate an 
ability to meet the FAA's 18-month schedule. Because the 
E-Systems1 DME/P design had very nearly been completed and tested 
prior to the award of the FAA contract, and with the understanding 
"
4
" OOQQOS 
that this proven design was to be utilized in the event of the 
award of the FAA contract to Hazeltine, E-Systems agreed to absorb 
the non-recurring costs for research and development of its DME/P 
design. At the time of the FAA contract award, E-Systems had 
already expended approximately 95 percent of the anticipated 
development costs for its design, using its own funds. 
10. On April 18, 1983, the FAA published its formal 
Request for Proposal No. DTFA-01-83-R-27174 for the MLS program 
(the "RFP"). Subsequently, in June 1983, Hazeltine submitted its 
proposal in response to the RFP, which included, among other 
things, actual test data for the E-Systems' DME/P. As 
anticipated, this data demonstrated that all of the major 
performance specifications called for by the FAA's RFP could be 
met by the originally developed E-Systems' design. 
11. During the latter part of 1983, Hazeltine and the 
FAA performed their evaluation of the E-Systems technical and cost 
proposals. As part of that review process, E-Systems met with 
Hazeltine and the FAA to provide clarification and answers to 
questions regarding E-Systems* proposed design for the DME/P 
system. As evidenced by the ultimate award of the prime contract 
to Hazeltine and the subsequent award of the subcontract to 
E-Systems, the originally proposed DME/P was determined by 
Hazeltine and the FAA to be adequate for contract performance. 
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12. On January 12, 1984, Hazeltine was awarded FAA 
Contract DTFA01-84-C00008 for the Microwave Landing System. 
Shortly thereafter, on January 31, 1984, Hazeltine issued to 
E-Systems its telex authorization to proceed with work. In 
accordance with the telex authorization and the 1982 Teaming 
Agreement, E-Systems accepted Hazeltine1s telex offer and 
commenced work as a subcontractor to Hazeltine at that time. 
13. On December 21, 1985, to "definitize" the telex 
authorization, Hazeltine and E-Systems agreed upon additional 
terms of the subcontract ("Subcontract K25213") for the 
development, production and delivery of 178 DME/P systems plus 
options for a total firm fixed price of $13,064,549.73. 
Modifications to the subcontract not relevant hereto subsequently 
reduced the fixed-price to $11,539,925.94. At the same time, the 
parties entered into a second Teaming Agreement, which superseded 
their prior agreement of December 7, 1982. Copies of the 
December 21, 1985 Teaming Agreement and Subcontract K25213 are 
attached hereto as Exhibits 2 and 3, respectively, and are 
incorporated herein by reference. 
14. To date, Hazeltine has made progress payments to 
E-Systems under the subcontract of approximately $7,000,000. 
15. By the time E-Systems received authorization to 
proceed under the subcontract, and as a direct result of E-Systems' 
company-funded program of development, an engineering model of 
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E-Systems* DME/P was 95 percent complete. It was understood and 
agreed upon by the parties that the subcontract would not contain 
any additional research and development costs because the DME/P 
proposed by E-Systems was based upon an existing, nearly finalized 
design, the cost of which had already been borne by E-Systems, and 
which previously had been shown to be capable of meeting all major 
performance specifications contained in the FAA*s original RFP. 
16. In negotiating the terms of the Teaming Agreement 
and subcontract, the parties relied upon the following understand-
ings, each of which was material to E-Systems1 decision to enter 
into an agreement with Hazeltine: 
a) the DME/P design which was proposed and priced 
by E-Systems during the proposal phase would be used for purposes 
of subcontract performance; 
b) because research and development of that DME/P 
design was essentially complete prior to contract and subcontract 
award, no additional development costs would have to be passed on 
to Hazeltine or, in turn, to the FAA; 
c) the E-Systems* design would meet all major DME/P 
specification requirements contained in the original FAA Request 
for Proposal; and, 
d) in order to comply with the FAA's 18-month 
program schedule, use of the existing DME/P design was not only 
preferable, but was, in fact, required. 
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17. After the issuance of the telex authorization to 
E-Systems, Hazeltine imposed a series of design and specification 
changes and new interpretations of existing specifications, which 
together constituted a drastic revision of the basic understandings 
on which the telex authorization, the definitized subcontract, and 
the Teaming Agreements were based. These changes and 
interpretations had not been made known to E-Systems at the time 
of the proposal preparation or subcontract award and, in virtually 
each instance, were contrary to the express understandings of both 
Hazeltine and E-Systems at the time the telex authorization was 
accepted and the subcontract entered into. Hazeltine subsequently 
refused to recognize these modifications under the "Changes" 
clause of the definitized subcontract and, therefore, refused to 
reimburse E-Systems for the added costs and expenses reasonably 
incurred by it in order to perform these changes. 
18. The modifications had the effect of altering the 
Subcontract from a contract for the production of equipment using 
an existing design (properly designated a "fixed-price" contract) 
to a contract under which Hazeltine claimed that E-Systems was 
responsible for developing an entirely new system that would meet 
its revised and considerably more demanding requirements (properly 
designated a "cost reimbursement" contract). However, a cost 
reimbursement contract was not provided to E-Systems, and yet 
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E-Systems was required by Hazeltine to perform the new development 
under the original fixed-price contract. 
19. Because of the modifications imposed upon it by 
Hazeltine, E-Systems was forced to abandon the design upon which 
its subcontract with Hazeltine was based and virtually to "start 
from scratch." Indeed, in actual flight testing by the FAA, the 
new design forced upon E-Systems provided test results ten times 
more precise than those required by the original specifications. 
20. As a further consequence of these modifications, 
E-Systems was required to perform substantial additional work and 
to incur additional costs over and above those contained in 
Subcontract K25213. These costs included both recurring costs 
(e.g.; material and production) and non-recurring costs (e.g., 
research and development) not envisioned by the parties. 
21. Pursuant to the terms of the subcontract, E-Systems 
submitted separate glaims totalling more than $10,000,000 for 
equitable adjustments for non-recurring and recurring costs on 
November 30, 1988 and May 12, 1989, respectively. In derogation 
of its contractual obligations under the subcontract, Hazeltine 
has: 1) refused to submit E-Systems1 certified claims for non-
recurring costs in a timely manner or to pursue those claims in 
good faith; 2) unreasonably delayed the processing of E-Systems* 
certified claim for recurring costs and has otherwise failed to 
pursue that claim in good faith; and 3) by its actions under the 
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prime contract with the FAA, has further prejudiced both 
E-Systems* certified claims for non-recurring and recurring costs. 
22. Upon information and belief, and in further 
derogation of E-Systems* rights and Hazeltine's duties under 
Subcontract K25213, Hazeltine informed the FAA in August 1988 that 
it intended to phase down its efforts under the prime contract in 
order to enter into a study period as a result of which virtually 
all work on the contract and related Subcontract K25213 came to a 
halt. Upon further information and belief, Hazeltine and the FAA 
subsequently enteied into a Memorandum of Understanding to permit 
resolution of the various contractual issues between them. 
23. E-Systems was not informed of such agreement or 
Memorandum of Understanding prior to its execution, nor was it 
permitted to participate in key meetings prior thereto, despite 
the fact that such meetings and agreement plainly affected terms, 
conditions and ultimate performance of the E-Systems' subcontract 
with Hazeltine. Hazeltine's failure to keep E-Systems informed as 
to these and other matters pertinent to E-Systems* performance 
violates and is in breach of the terms of the Teaming Agreement, 
which expressly provides that "Hazeltine will at all times during 
the period of this Teaming Agreement keep [E-Systems] fully 
advised of the status of each proposal, contract, subcontract or 
modification to the prime contract which affects [E-Systems] and 
inquiries and comments with respect thereto. Hazeltine will also 
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afford [E-SystemsJ the opportunity to be present at all key 
presentations, discussions, conferences or program reviews, 
whether pursuant to a solicitation or under awarded contract(s), 
where the product of E-Systems is under discussion. . . . " 
Exhibit 2 at page 3. 
24. Throughout the performance period of the 
subcontract, Hazeltine has repeatedly breached the terms of its 
agreement with E-Systems by failing to provide necessary support 
services requested by E-Systems as provided for under the terms of 
the subcontract. By way of example, and without intended 
limitation, Hazeltine failed to resolve several issues regarding 
the number and unit price of equipment called for under the 
subcontract, claiming that the issue was pending final resolution 
of Hazeltine's own disputes with the FAA under its prime 
contract. Similarly, Hazeltine has refused to witness various 
testing procedures or to pursue FAA approval of so-called First 
Article Testing ("FAT"). As a result, and despite repeated 
requests by E-Systems for this and other similar support, 
Hazeltine's breach of contract has rendered E-Systems unable to 
perform necessary testing of its new DME/P, and has left it in a 
position in which it is clearly untenable, if not impossible, for 
E-Systems to proceed with the production and delivery of the 
system. 
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25. Hazeltine's conduct has placed E-Systems in a 
"stop-work" position under the terms of its subcontract; by virtue 
of the fact that Hazeltine has called an effective halt to the 
program by not permitting E-Systems to proceed with the testing 
and production of the DME/P system despite E-Systems having been 
ready, willing and able to do so. By letters dated July 13, 1988; 
July 21, 1988, July 27, 1988, August 3, 1988, August 26, 1988, 
September 19, 1988 and September 26, 1988, E-Systems documented 
the delay and disruption occasioned by Hazeltine's conduct, and 
ultimately informed Hazeltine that, as a result, E-Systems had 
been placed in a stop-work position for purposes of future 
performance under the subcontract. Copies of these letters are 
attached hereto as Exhibits 4 through 10, respectively, and are 
incorporated herein by reference. 
26. Hazeltine initially took the position that, despite 
its phase-down, E-Systems could nevertheless complete various 
discrete tasks under the subcontract. Hazeltine was, however, 
unable to identify any such tasks during a meeting convened for 
that purpose in January 1989. 
27. As a consequence of Hazeltine's constructive 
stop-work order, E-Systems has been required to expend substantial 
resources in order to assure that it would remain ready to perform 
its obligations under the subcontract should Hazeltine lift the 
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stop-work and request E-Systems to complete performance. To date, 
no such request has been received by E-Systems. 
28. Pursuant to Article XXXVII of Subcontract K25213, 
Hazeltine must, within 90 days of the date that it imposes a 
stop-work condition upon E-Systems, either cancel the stop-work 
condition (that is, permit E-Systems to complete performance) or 
terminate the subcontract for convenience pursuant to the 
"Termination for Convenience" clause of Article XXXVII of the 
subcontract. See Exhibit 3, Art. XXXVII at pages 111-10 and 
111-30. 
29. Because Hazeltine has permitted the stop-work 
condition to persist for more than 90 days without permitting 
E-Systems to return to work, the subcontract has, by its terms, 
constructively been terminated by convenience, entitling E-Systems 
to an award of the various costs, together with a reasonable 
margin of profit, as more fully set forth under Article XXXVII of 
the subcontract. 
30. At all times relevant hereto, E-Systems has remained 
fully ready, willing and able to perform the services and 
obligations required of it under the terms of its agreement with 
Hazeltine. 
COUNT ONE 
(Breach of Contract — Subcontract K25213) 
31. E-Systems incorporates by reference the allegations 
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set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 30 as though fully set forth 
herein. 
32. The unilateral acts and omissions of Hazeltine were 
in derogation of E-Systems* rights under, and in breach of the 
terms of, Subcontract K25213. 
33. As a result of Hazeltine's breach, E-Systems has 
been unable to perform its obligations under the subcontract. 
34. E-Systems has remained ready, willing and able to 
perform each and every obligation required of it under the 
parties' original agreement. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff E-Systems, Inc./Montek Division 
demands judgment against defendant Hazeltine Corporation as 
follows: 
a) a declaration that Hazeltine Corporation's 
conduct constitutes a constructive Notice to Stop Work under 
Article XXXVII of Subcontract K25213; 
b) a declaration that, by virtue of Hazeltine's 
inaction, Subcontract K25213 has been terminated for convenience 
pursuant to Article XXXVII of the subcontract; 
c) an award to E-Systems of its recurring and 
non-recurring costs incurred as a result of Hazeltine Corpora-
tion's wrongful conduct, in an amount not less than $20,000,000, 
together with interest and a reasonable margin of profit thereon; 
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d) an award of E-Systems' costs and reasonable 
attorneys' fees, together with such other relief as the Court may 
deem appropriate. 
COUNT TWO 
(Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing — Subcontract K25213) 
35. E-Systems incorporates by reference the allegations 
set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 34 as though fully set forth 
herein. 
36. In entering into Subcontract K25213 with E-Systems, 
Hazeltine impliedly agreed to carry out in good faith the 
obligations and duties imposed upon it, including, inter alia, the 
provision of support services which served as the necessary basis 
for E-Systems* performance under the subcontract. 
37. By failing to honor its obligations under the 
subcontract and by purposefully delaying and disrupting E-Systems' 
performance thereunder, Hazeltine breached its implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. 
38. As a result of Hazeltine's conduct, including its 
failure to take any action regarding the constructive stop-work 
order imposed upon E-Systems by it, E-Systems has been damaged in 
an amount not less than $20,000,000. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff E-Systems, Inc./Montek Division 
demands judgment against defendant Hazeltine Corporation as 
follows: 
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a) a declaration that Hazeltina Corporation^* 
conduct constitutes a constructive Notice to Stop Work undei 
Article XXXVII of Subcontract K25213; 
b) a declaration that, by virtue of Hazeltine's 
inaction, Subcontract K25213 has been terminated for convenience 
pursuant to Article XXXVII of the subcontract; 
c) an award to E-Systems of its recurring and 
non-recurring costs incurred as a result of Hazelt-me Corpo-
ration's wrongful conduct, in an amount not less than $20,000,000, 
together with interest and a reasonable margin of profit thereon; 
d) an award of E-Systems' costs and reasonable 
attorneys' fees, together with such other relief as the Court may 
deem appropriate. 
COUNT THREE 
(Breach of Contract — Teaming Agreement) 
39. E-Systems incorporates by reference the allegations 
set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 38 as though fully set forth 
herein. 
40. The unilateral acts and omissions of Hazeltme were 
in derogation of E-Systems' rights under, and in breach of the 
terms of, the December 21, 1985 Teaming Agreement. 
41. As a result of Hazeltine's breach, E-Systems has 
been unable to perform its obligations under the Teaming Agreement. 
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42. E-Systems has remained ready, willing and able to 
perform each and every obligation required of it under the 
parties' Teaming Agreement. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff E-Systems, Inc./Montek Division 
demands judgment against defendant Hazeltine Corporation in an 
amount to be determined at trial, but in no event less than 
$20,000,000, representing the costs and expenses incurred by 
E-Systems as a result of defendant's breach of the Teaming 
Agreement, together with interest, costs and attorneys' fees, and 
such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate. 
COUNT FOUR 
(Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing -- Teaming Agreement) 
43. E-Systems incorporates by reference the allegations 
set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 42 as though fully set forth 
herein. 
44. In entering into the December 21, 1985 Teaming 
Agreement with E-Systems, Hazeltine impliedly agreed to carry out 
in good faith the obligations and duties imposed upon it, 
including, inter alia, its duty to keep E-Systems fully informed 
as to developments affecting its performance under the subcontract, 
as well as its duty to perform diligently its own obligations and 
responsibilities under the prime contract with the FAA. 
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45. By failing to perform diligently its obligations 
under the prime contract and by refusing to keep E-Systems fully 
informed as to all pertinent developments affecting E-Systems* 
performance under its subcontract with Hazeltine, Hazeltine 
breached its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
46. As a result of Hazeltine's breach, E-Systems has 
been damaged in an amount not less than $20,000,000. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff E-Systems, Inc./Montek Division 
demands judgment against defendant Hazeltine Corporation in an 
amount to be determined at trial, but in no event less than 
$20,000,000, together with interest, costs and attorneys* fees, 
and such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff E-Systems, Inc./Montek Division, hereby demands 
a trial by jury as to all issues of fact triable as of right by a 
jury. 
DATED this^jO-^day of July, 1989. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
Merlin 0. Baker 
Jonathan A. Dibble 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
( 8 0 1 ) 5 3 2 - 1 5 0 0 
- 1 8 -
000019 
A. %*JL^ 
fames A. Hourihan 
JGAN & HARTSON 
555 Thirteenth Street, N.W, 
Washington, D.C. 20004 
(202) 637-6544 
Plaintiff's address: 
2268 South 3270 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
Richard E. Dunne, III 
Joseph H. Young 
HOGAN & HARTSON 
111 South Calvert Street 
Suite 1600 
Baltimore, Maryland 21202 
(301) 659-2700 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
E-Systems, Inc./Montek Division 
0825b 
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WILLIAM V. PENNEY 
Plaintiff, Appearing Pro Se 
709 West Rusk Suite "A" 
Rockwall, TX 75087 
Telephone: 214/771-8383 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM V. PENNEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
E-SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, DAVID A. 
WILLIAMS, ALFRED B. BUCHANAN, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO 
DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER 
AND STATEMENT ALLOWING 
FILING OR USE OF 
PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION BY 
DEFENDANTS 
Civil No. 900903522CV 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
Ct Of Appeals # 930368-CA 
Pursuant to the order of the THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT in 
the above case filed as of August 9, 1993, and pursuant to Utah 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(h), Plaintiff William V. Penney 
("Penney"), appearing pro se, hereby files his PLAINTIFFS 
OBJECTION TO DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER AND STATEMENT ALLOWING FILING 
OR USE OF PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION BY DEFENDANTS as follows: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. It was agreed by defendants' counsel in advance of their 
taking Penney's deposition that they would limit each deposition 
session to a morning session not to exceed two to three hours in 
duration. See attached copy of August 13, 1990 letter of Penney's 
counsel Mr. L. Zane Gill to defendants' counsel which stated, among 
other things: 
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I appreciate your accommodation with regard to the 
scheduling of the depositions set for my client. Mr. 
Penney's physical condition makes it very difficult for 
him to do anything that requires constant attention for 
more than two or three hours at a time. 
(See also copy of attached AFFIDAVIT OF ALLEN J. MERil, M.D., 
from R.565) 
2. By letter dated August 10, 1990, defendants' counsel 
Douglas R. Davis agreed to time limitations requested by Penney as 
follows: 
Regarding your request to limit the number of hour your 
client must sit through his deposition scheduled for 
September 10, 1990, we will certainly be willing to make 
any appropriate accommodations, including continuing the 
deposition until the next day, September 11, 1990, if 
necessary. (See attached copy of said August 10, 1990 
letter) 
3. Despite defendants' counsels' express written and oral 
promises, though Penney's deposition commenced at 9:30 a.m. on the 
morning of September 10, 1990, defendants' counsel breached their 
promise and required Penney to continue in the deposition until 
4:30 p.m. of that day, long after Penney had been forced to exceed 
his physical limitations. 
4. Despite defendants' counsels' express written and oral 
promises, though Penney's deposition resumed at 8:33 a.m. on the 
morning of September 11, 1990, defendants' counsel breached their 
promise and required Penney to continue in the deposition until 
3:50 p.m., long after Penney had been forced to exceed his physical 
limitations. 
5. In his September 14, 1990 letter, Penney's former counsel 
L. Zane Gill censored defendants' counsel for their flagrant 
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violation of their express written and oral agreement to limit 
Penney's deposition to mornings and to two to three hour sessions. 
(See attached 9/14/1990 letter of Gill to Parsons, Behle & Latimer) 
6. After receiving a printed copy of his deposition, Penney 
found many errors, paraphrasing, omissions, and sections taken out 
of context that Penney objected to. 
7. Penney's attorney of record of the time informed Penney 
that there was a deadline to be met and, therefore, said attorney 
used a signature that Penney had left with said counsel to affix 
Penney's "signature" to the deposition. 
8. Since Penney did not actually sign the deposition, it was 
never corrected, dated nor notarized as required. 
9. Through no fault of Penney7s, defendants' counsel 
negligently did not file the deposition, but chose to reference and 
submit selected pages to the District Court in order to distort and 
support their inaccurate positions. 
10. Though final Judgment was entered in the above case on 
March 9, 1993 and Penney served his Notice of Appeal on April 7, 
1993, the District Court's ORDER AND STATEMENT OF PROPOSED CHANGES 
TO THE RECORD, which purportedly allows Penney's deposition to be 
unsealed, was not filed until August 9, 1993, and allows the Penney 
deposition to be filed "as of July 9, 1993", some four (4) months 
after final Judgment was entered in the above case. 
11. In his oral argument before the District Court on July 9, 
1993, defendants' counsel David Anderson, Esq., expressly conceded 
that Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(h) did not allow the 
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"late" admission of the Penney deposition. 
12. It is Penney7s position that the Penney deposition was 
"contaminated", that it should NOT be allowed to be filed or used 
in any way, and that NO judgment should enter against Penney for 
any costs associated with the contaminated Penney deposition. 
DISCUSSION 
By Penney's NOTICE OF APPEAL of April 6, 1993, Penney appealed 
certain specified judgments, orders, acts and omissions of the 
District Court that had occurred prior to the final Judgment dated 
March 9, 1993. The Penney deposition was never corrected, never 
signed, never notarized and never filed with the District Court 
prior to March 9, 1993. Hence, the District Court never had access 
to and made or entered NO judgments or orders based on said Penney 
deposition. The effect of the District Court's ordering that the 
Penney deposition may be filed "as of July 9, 1993" is to have said 
deposition introduced for the first time on appeal which is wholly 
inappropriate as being contrary to applicable rules of appellate 
procedure, existing case law and contrary to the requirements of 
just and equitable treatment of the parties in the above case. 
In his oral argument before the District Court on July 9, 
1993, defendants' counsel David Anderson, Esq., expressly conceded 
that Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(h) did not allow the 
"late" admission of the Penney deposition. 
Neither the District Court nor the Appellate Court should 
allow the filing, publication, or consideration of the Penney 
deposition where the Penney deposition was taken by defendants' 
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counsel in a manner that materially and substantially breached and 
violated their express written and oral promises to Penney and his 
counsel of record and where that breach and violation resulted in 
substantial, material and irreparable harm to Penney. 
If the District Court or Appellate Court allow, for any 
reason, the filing of the Penney deposition, absolutely no or 
negligible credence, credibility, or other consideration should be 
given to the Penney deposition by the Appellate Court in the 
context of Penney7s appeal because said Penney deposition was 
"contaminated" by defendants7 counsels' taking and conducting the 
Penney deposition in a manner that materially and substantially 
breached and violated their express written and oral promises to 
Penney and his counsel of record and that breach and violation 
resulted in substantial, material and irreparable harm to Penney. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFOR, based on the facts and law previously cited herein, 
the District Court and Appellate Court should NOT allow the filing 
of the Penney deposition; and, if the filing of the Penney 
deposition is allowed for any reason, absolutely no or negligible 
credence, credibility, or other consideration should be given to 
the Penney deposition by the Appellate Court in the context of 
Penney7s appeal because said Penney deposition was "contaminated" 
by defendants7 counsels7 taking and conducting the Penney 
deposition in a manner that materially and substantially breached 
and violated their express written and oral promises to Penney and 
his counsel of record and that breach and violation resulted in 
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substantial, material and irreparable harm to Penney. 
Respectfully submitted this 19 day of August, 1993. 
/s/ William V. Penney 
William v. Penney, Pro Se 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 19 day of 
August, 1993, a true, accurate and complete copy of the foregoing 
was served upon the defendants by the undersigned's mailing same 
first class mail postage prepaid as follows: 
DAVID A. ANDERSON, Esq. 
PAUL E. DAME, Esq. 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main St., Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
230 South 500 East 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
/s/ Eleonore Fox 
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WILLIAM V. PENNEY "' 
Pro 8a 
233a Seat Cliff Swallow Driva 
Sandy, Utah 14093 
Telephone* 801/944-0993 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 07 SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM V. PENNEY! 
Plaintiff, 
vs« 
E-SYSTEMfl, INC., a Dalawara 
corporation, DAVID A. 
WILLIAMS, ALFRED B. BUCHANAN, 
Dafandanta• 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
ALLEN J. MERIL, M.D. 
Civil No. 900903522CV 
Judge Frank G. Noal 
STATE 07 TEXAS ) 
I aa. 
COUNTY OF DALLAS > 
I, ALLEN J. MERIL, having first baan aworn, atata undar oath! 
1. I an a citizen of tha united States of America, a resident 
of tha State of Taxaa, and of the County of Dallaa, and an and have 
baan at all relevant tines a physician, radical doctor and aurgaon 
licensed by and practicing in tha Stata of Texas, 
2. I have baan Mr. William V. Panney'a ("Mr. Penney's") 
phyaioian and surgeon ainca 196$ regarding spina injuries resulting 
from an automobile aaoidant in that ease year. 
3. Surgery was performed on Mr. Penney'a naofc in 1967 and 
again in 198S. Although aware of injuries to the lower apina and 
in tha cheat area, a oonservativa approach using alternatives to 
surgery were taXan dua to the oritical nature of the areas injured. 
4. As his oondition continued to deteriorate, new M.R.I, 
teohnoiogy was uaad to identify Bpecifio areas requiring aurgioal 
intervention. Surgery on tha low back was performed on 11-13-91 
See attached report, where electronic bone grovth simulators and 
mechanical support devices vsre installed. 
9. Subsequently, Mr, Penney's recovery reached a point to 
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where ha vas strong though that ha vas rafsrrsd to spaoialiats for 
•valuation of tha chest spins condition. After svaluation by Andri 
Critrom, M»D. ( Orthopedic Surgeon/Chest Speoialiat), Walter 
Bobechoo, M.D. ( Orthopedic Surgeon/Tumor Specialist), and Michael 
Mack, M.D. ( Thoracic Surgeon/Cardiac Specialist) surgery vaa 
scheduled for Mr. Pannay at Medical City Hospital in Dallas, Texas 
in March of 1993/ see attached report. 
6. Mr Penney began phyaioal therapy again after an extended 
period of in hone nursing support. During his recovery and 
physical therapy period, Mr. Psnnay broke ons of tha rode of the 
mechanical support davics that had been previously installed during 
the low baok surgery, Mr. Pannay had not recovered from tha chest 
surgery to a point where it vas advisable to operate on tha lov 
baok again. He vas advissd to stop all physical therapy and 
activity until ha had recovered enough and vas strong enough for 
surgery to be scheduled. 
7. Mr. Penney, hovever, insisted on traveling to salt Lake 
city, Utah in order to attend a meeting with a judge presiding over 
a litigation that he vas a party to. The surgery vas scheduled 
after his trip. Fortunately, no further damage vas oaueed due to 
his travels and surgery vaa performed at Garland Community Hospital 
in August of 1992, sse attached report. Tha surgery vas performed 
and tha broken rod, the alectronios for the bone growth stimulator, 
and tha other mechanical support devices were removed. Since that 
time Mr, Penney has experienced significant pain from both the low 
back and the chest conditions and still takes a aignifleant amount 
of medication for his physical as veil as psychological conditions. 
8. It la my opinion that Mr. Penney's physical and mental 
condition would have had a negative affect on his ability to 
participate in the discovery process of a litigation. The combined 
affeata of his pain, trauma, and mediaation would have a profound 
negative affect on his ability to think and funotion normally. At 
present his lover spine is progressing slowly as a result of on-
going phyaiosl therapy, but Mr. Penney still has limited physioal 
and mental capabilities due to his chest/spine condition and the 
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oumulativa affacta of hia pravieua aurgariaa* 
9. X hava known Mr* Fannay ainoa 1972 and parforaad a spina 
fuaion in 1976 that halpad him raoovar oonplataly fron a dlaabled 
condition to becoaa « productiva member of sooiaty again* I know 
hin to ba -an honaat parson who sets poaitiva goala and follows his 
phyaicians' instruotions. 
FURTHER AFIANT SAITH NAUGHT. 
DATED this _ day of Fabruary, 1993. 
Allan J. HerilT M.D. 
x'B^ fiBCR'IBED-AND SWORK to bafora ma, a notary public on tha 
)py^' d*y. of, February, 1993. 
s i 
^A;>"' 
My commission axpiraai 
j^\ ^ *^V;;^* S\ VS^OSLA^ 
Raaiding a t ^ V ^ C L O ^ C M J T W V ^ 
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PENNEY, WILLIAM 1-19710-2 ALLEN J. MERIL, M.D. 
TATE OF OPERATIONi 
PREOPERATIVE DIAGNOSISi 
POSTOPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS! 
OPERATION PERFORMED: 
11/13/91 OPERATIVE NOTE 
1. Disk disruption syndrome L3-4, L4-5. 
Same. 
1. Repeat bilateral laminectomy, excision 
of disk L3-4, L4-5. 
2. Posterior lumbar interbody fusion with 
EBI implantable stimulator L3-4, L4-
5. 
3. Segmental fixation with Harm's device 
L3-4, L4-5. 
4. Insertion of epidural catheter for 
continuous epidural Fentanyl 
administration. 
SURGEON; Dr. Meril 
ASSISTANT SURGEONi Dr. Whelan 
?, A. ASSISTANT: Steve Allen, A. Geiger 
ANESTHESIA.' 
DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDUREi Patient was prepped and draped in a 
sterile manner. Previous midline incision was utilized. 
Paravertebral musculature was stripped bilaterally from L3-4, L4-5-
interlaminar spaces under image intensifier control to correctly 
identify the proper spaces. A generous bilateral laminectomy and 
partial facetectomy was carried out at L3-4 and L4-5 in anticipation 
of the posterior lumbar interbody fusion. Moderately bulging disks 
were encountered at both L3-4, L4-5 and postoperative change most 
marked at L4-5 left. The disk was entered with a #15 blade, and with 
graduated pituitary rongeurs, curettes, and high speed bur, a 
thorough diskectomy was accomplished. Then, a pilot hole was started 
with a #0 starter, and then with high speed burs and the Anspach end 
cutter, circular troughs were made bilaterally at L3-4, L4-5 for the 
posterior lumbar interbody fusion. Four patellar grafts were taken 
and trimmed to appropriate size, and then longitudinal troughs were 
placed sibout ^ach graft, and a single diagonal hole was placed within 
•>ach graft. 
The EBI units times two were tested, found to be active. Cathode was 
then threaded in and around each of the four grafts. Then, each 
(CONTINUED NEXT PAGE) 
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graft uas gently tamped into place first at the L4-5 left, and then 
L3-4. Then similarly, the grafts on the right were gently tamped 
into place. Surgicel v;as placed over the exposed grafts, and the 
cathodes were packed to the lateral wall, and there was no contact 
noted with the dura or nerve roots. 
Then, the junction of the transverse process pedicles were identified 
at the pedicle of L3-4 and L5. With a high speed bur, this area was 
^corticated, exposing cancellous bone within the pedicle, Then, 
under image intensifier control, gear shift was utilized and each 
pedicle was probed. Pedicles were tapped, and then 4 cm. screws were 
utilized at all levels, and were advanced under image intensifier 
control. Then, a bar was taken and trimmed to appropriate size, and 
placed into the slotted heads of the screws, and then the nuts were 
tightened, giving excellent stability. 
A tunnel was then made under the retained lamina of L3, and througfi 
a separate stab wound, an epidural catheter was introduced 
approximately 10 cm. from distal to proximal for continuous epidural 
Fentanyl administration. 
Free fat grafts *fere placed over the exposed dura, and the wound was 
irrigated again. It had been irrigated throughout the procedure with 
triple antibiotic solution. The wound was then closed in layers, and 
~.\e patient was returned to Recovery Ward in good condition. 
AJH/jsc 
0:11/13/91 
T;11/14/91 
Y1G 
ALLEN J. MERIL, M.D, 
Whelan 
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DATE 07 OPERATION: 0 3 / 1 0 / 9 2 
PREOPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS: 
POSTOPSRATITE DIA5N0SI8* 
COS URGE ONS; 
QPHtATION PBUTOSMEDI 
ANESTHESIA; 
AMESTHSSIOLOOISTs 
HamanytoM of T7 v e r t e b r a l body. 
Hemangioma of T7 v er tebra l body. 
i n d r e l Cxitram, M#D. (Aaalatant: S r , Bobechko) 
V a l t a r Bobechko, M*D. (As ei a t e n t : Dr. Cai troa) 
Michael Mack, M.D. (Aaalatant; Dr« CaifcrooO 
Ver tebra l corpactomy of T7 with r a d i c a l a t c i H o a 
o f hemangioma through t rans thorac i c approach 
w i t h decompreeeioa of the a p i n a l cord . 
General . 
Donald L» Drennon* M.D. 
CLINICAL NOTEi Mr. Penney la a 49-year-old man who baa had 
chronic mid thoracic back pain aacondary ta>a hewngiotte in the jbody of T7 for 
several yeera* The pain came on after a motor vehicle accident; in 1988. The 
patient underwent cerrioal fuaiona and lumbar fuaiona which eredicated hie 
cervical and lumbar pain, and ha waa l e f t with a mldtboracic pain. He wee 
admitted a lec t lve ly for e transthoracic reaactLon of the symptomatic 
hemangioma in the T7 vertebra. 
DESCRIPTION OF OPERATION: Procedure involved Dr. Michael Mack who 
performed a thoracotomy for axpoeure. Dr. Andrei Czitrom performed the 
vertebral COtpectomy of 17 by transthoracic approach with decompression of the 
apinal cord* Dr, Bobachko performed the intararthrodaaie and atabi l l sat ions 
of the eplae, Thle note w i l l only document the procedure performed by Dr. 
Cxitrom, which ia the vertebral corpactomy of T7. 
I t should be noted that Dr. Ctitrom aaaiated Dr. Bobechko and Dti Bobechko 
ass i s ted Dr. Caitrom during their reepective part of the operative procedure. 
The p e t i t a t wai positioned on the table in the right l a t era l poaition and the 
l e f t thoracotomy waa carried out by Dr« Michael Meckv After a*po*ure of the 
aplna by thoracotomy and the l i ga t ion of the three segmental veaaela in the 
area of T7» T8 and T6, the vertebral corpactomy was begun* f i r s t by 
identifying the levala with the help of needles placed into the dlak spaces of 
what waa thought to be tha T6-7 and the X7-8 disk spaces* X-ray veri f icat ion 
of tha correct l e v e l waa obtained. 
I t should be noted that apinal cord monitoring waa need throughout t h i s 
procedure. The 6th r ib had haen removed by Dr* Michael Mack and thle provided 
excel lent exposure of the l e v e l of T6, T7 and T8. 
A longitudinal incis ion wee mada through the perioBtaum at tha l e v e l of T6, T7 
and T8» and tha periosteum waa ref lected anteriorly with the help of 
e levators . Bleeding waa controlled with electrocautery and with the Argon 
beam coagulator. After ref lect ion of the periosteum* the T7 vertebra 
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appeared slightly abnormal -with more bleeding than the adjacent vertebrae* A 
small osteotome wae used to cut a window in the vertebra, sod following thie, 
a curette waa uaad to acoop out the bone of the vertebra until the abnormal 
tiseue wea encountered, which appeared to be sore fatty*looking and was 
bleeding quite briskly* Hemostasia was achieved at each steps using tha Argon 
beast coagulate?, ae well as Surgical and Gelfoa* soaked with thrombin. 
The level was again identified after the initial window waa made by placing a 
vascular clip Into the vertebra, and again verifying that the correct level 
waa operated on, which waa T7, 
Tha MRI previously ahowed that the left aide of T7 was Involved, including the 
pedicle* Careful removal*of hone wee carried out, beginning from the 
midvertebre towards the posterior aspect of the vertebra, using curat tea, 
JCerrison rongpure, aa well as pituitary rongeurs* 
After meticulous dissection and quite frectuent intervals, during which 
hemostaals waa carried out, the abnormal tissue was removed bit by bit from 
the posterior aspect of the vertebral body of T7* The pedicle was also 
removed and thie ultimately led to the entrance into the spinel canal. The 
dure waa exposed gradually, and the spinal cord waa decompressed of the 
mixture of heimngioma, tissue and bony tissue that was present In the area* 
The removal continued end the disk betwwen T6-T7 and T7-T8 wee removed. The 
dura waa decompreaeed circumferentially and a nerve probe could be placed into 
the spinal canal, up and down, without any difficulty at the end of the 
deoompreaelon. The vertebral body bleeding was controlled with Surgical and 
Gelfoam packs using thrombin and adrenalin* 
During the procedure, the Cell 8aver wea uaad and a total of 2 unite waa 
relnfused into the patient* One unit of autologous blood waa also reinfueed 
during the procedure. 
After the entire decompression waa completed and heooetaaiB waa accomplished, 
Dr« Bobechko proceeded to carry out the reconstruction, using a rib graft for 
arthrodesis and anterior spinal plating using tha Alps pitting system. This 
part of the procedure will be described in a separate report by pr, Bobechko* 
At the end of the reconetruction, during which fir. Caitrom assisted Dr* 
Bobechko, the hemostasia waa again completed end a Marl ex mesh was attached to 
the parietal pleura, in erdar to cover the plate and the bolts, and protect 
the eorta from them. 
At the end of this, Dr» Michael Mac* proceeded to cloae the cheat, *rt thie la 
described in a separate report* 
The procedure waa carried out without any coaplicetione with a total blood 
loss of approximately 2,000 cc* Patient waa tranafuaed one autologous unit 
and was given back 2 units through the Cell sever. 
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He returned to tbt tmovry l o w 1A wrceUtnt condition sad the spinal cord 
•onitoring stayed stable throughout the procedure. 
Andrei Csitroa, M.D« 
AC/»«7 
D: 03/10/92 
T: 03/11/92 
5945R 
ee: 3 copies to Dr. Critroa 
Walter Bobechko, M.D. 
Michaal Mac*, M.D. 
Jon Blacalty, M.D. 
Allen Jfartl, K.U, (Garland) 
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DATE OF OPERATION; 
PREOPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS: 
8-19-92 OPERATIVE NOTE 
1. Status post posterior interbody 
fusion, L3-4 and L4-5, with retained 
fractured Harm's device and EBI 
generators x 2* 
POSTOPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS: Same. 
OPERATION PERFORMED: 
SURGEON: 
ASSISTANT: 
PA ASSISTANT: 
ANESTHESIA: 
1. Removal of fractured Harm's device, 
L3-4 and L4-5, and explant EBI bone 
generators x 2. 
Dr. Meril, 
Dr. Whelan 
Steve Allen, P.A. 
TECHNIQUE: The patient was prepped and draped in the sterile manner. 
The anesthesiologist had placed an epidural catheter for 
postoperative Fentanyl; however, the catheter was placed too low 
necessitating removal of the catheter, reprepping and redraping this 
patient. The previous incision was then utilized. The paravertebral 
musculature was stripped from the inter laminar spaces at L3-4 and L4-
5, and the Harm's device was circumscribed with the high-speed Onspa 
side cutter* The nuts were backed off one by one. The bar was 
removed, and all three screws were removed from the pedicles. The 
EBI generators had been placed on both sides of the spinous processes 
at approximately L2 where this area was explored* The EBI generators 
were exposed and circumscribed. Each was removed, and the wires were 
cut. The wound was copiously irrigated with double-antibiotic 
solution, and then closed in layers. The patient was returned to the 
Recovery Ward in good condition. 
AM/cmg 
D6T:8/19/92 
G23 ALLEN MERIL. M.D. 
